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Graduate medical education (GME) is the postgraduate
medical education required for all medical school graduates
pursuing licensure. Since World War II, the military
medical services have undertaken full time inservice GME
missions to ensure a supply of quality physicians and
surgeons for both the military' s wartime readiness and
peacetime health benefit missions. However, determining
the number of active duty physicians and surgeons, and the
specialties which they practice, has been a complex and
controversial issue within military medicine, particularly
since the end of the Cold War.
This thesis examines the factors impacting the future
size and scope of military GME. A comprehensive history of
military GME is provided. Detailed events and issues
impacting GME which surfaced following the Cold War are
also discussed. The current Department of Defense GME
policy and funding issues are examined, as well as the
operational GME implementation model developed by the
United States Navy.
This thesis found that GME has historically been a
valuable tool for recruiting, training, and retaining
quality physicians and surgeons. Post Cold War budget
constraints and readiness policies and private sector
changes in GME are likely to force changes in military GME
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Medicine is one of the highest paid and most respected
professions in America. It is conducted in a dynamic,
complex, labor intensive, technology reliant, and, most
importantly, expensive health care delivery system. This
system provides essential health and medical services that
are in high demand. This system relies on an educated,
diverse group of professionals, including researchers,
nurses, therapists, technicians, managers, administrators,
analysts, and lawyers.
The health care industry is most dependent on the
pivotal, critical members of the health care delivery team,
the physicians and surgeons. These doctors' decisions
determine how most health resources are used, including the
care provided by other professionals, laboratory services,
return visits, and hospital use. Doctors ultimately
determine the availability, quality, and costs of health
care services. Therefore, issues related to health care
reform, increased access to health care services, health
care cost containment, and quality improvement must consider
the supply, distribution, and education of physicians and
surgeons [Ref . 1]
.
A key distinguishing characteristic of health care is
the education and experience required to become a doctor and
practice medicine. Physician education and training usually
takes 11 to 13 years beyond high school. Following
undergraduate education and the Medical College Admissions
Test, the first step in becoming a doctor and practicing
medicine is completing four years of medical school.
Competition to get into the nation's 126 allopathic and 17
osteopathic medical schools is extremely intense, and the
number of annual applicants far exceeds the available slots.
In 1996, approximately one third of the 50,000 applicants to
allopathic medical schools were accepted. That same year
10,781 students applied for 2,200 slots in the nation's 17
osteopathic medical schools [Ref. 2].
Medical school is an intense four year experience. The
first two years consist of didactic instruction and the last
two years concentrate on clinical exposure to many different
specialties, including internal medicine, pediatrics,
obstetrics and gynecology, family practice, psychiatry, and
general surgery [Ref. 3] . Medical school is also very
expensive, with costs approaching $200,000 for four years.
This forces most graduating doctors to accumulate debts
[Ref. 4] .
Medicine is the only profession where graduation from
professional school is insufficient for entry into active
practice. All states require doctors to receive supervised
clinical experience through graduate medical education (GME)
prior to licensure and independent practice [Ref . 5]
.
GME is conducted in programs called residencies.
Residency programs include three distinct training phases:
internships, residencies, and fellowships. Each phase
offers more specialized training than the previous phase.
First year residents are referred to as interns, and the
first year of residency or the transitional internship is
referred to as postgraduate year one (PGY-1) . Residents are
GME trainees in postgraduate year two (PGY-2) or beyond who
are training for certification in a particular medical or
surgical specialty such as internal medicine. Fellows are
residents who are training for certification in a medical or
surgical subspecialty, such as internal medicine
cardiology. Appendix B shows an overview of residency
positions and lengths of GME training.
The overwhelming majority (92 percent) of the nation's
15,000 annual medical school graduates apply for internships
and residencies in the approximately 2,000 U. S. teaching
hospitals through the National Residency Matching Program
(NRMP) . The NRMP is a computerized program. Prospective
residents rate and rank their preferences for residency
programs, and residency programs rate and rank their
priorities for particular medical students. The prospective
residents and residency programs submit their preferences,
and the NRMP computer program matches students and GME
programs. The results are released annually in March. The
residents and residency programs are bound by the NRMP match
[Ref . 6]
.
GME programs are accredited by the Accreditation
Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME)
.
Accreditation is a voluntary process for determining whether
a GME program is in sustantial compliance with established
educational standards. Accreditation represents a
professional judgment about the quality of the GME program.
The ACGME performs the accreditation process through 24
Residency Review Committees (RRC) and a Transitional Year
Review Committee (TYRC) . The ACGME sets standards and
policies for accredited GME programs; the RRCs and the TYRC
perform on site reviews to ensure compliance with the
established standards and policies [Ref. 7]
.
The American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) is the
unbrella organization that coordinates 24 medical specialty
boards. Each of these ABMS specialty boards evaluates
candidates in its field who voluntarily appear for
examination. The boards certify as diplomates those who are
qualified. One of the qualifications for board
certification in any of the ABMS certified specialties is
completing an ACGME accredited program [Ref. 8].
Board certified specialists are among the highest paid
medical professionals in the nation. Figure 1.1 shows the
annual average 1992 salaries for some specialties in the
private sector health care industry [Ref. 9].
1992 AVERAGE ANNUAL SALARIES BY SPECIALTY
Specialty Mean Physician Net Income
Surgery $233,800
Radiology $229,800
Obstetrics /Gynecoloqy $221, 800
Anesthesiology $221,100
Pathology $197,700







Jonas' s Health Care Delivery
In the United States (Fifth Edition)
Health care delivery has experienced dramatic cost
increases and is widely recognized as being over
specialized. This is dramatically affecting the way
physicians practice medicine. It has also shifted medical
insurance coverage from liberal fee for service insurance to
stricter managed care options, particularly health
maintenance organizations (HMO)
.
From 1990 to 1995, the percentage of U. S. physicians
who worked for HMOs increased from 36 to 64 percent; 83
percent of doctors were in practices with at least one
managed care contract [Ref . 10] . HMOs seek to contain
medical costs by emphasizing primary care physicians
(internal medicine, family practice, and pediatric
specialties) rather than more specialized doctors. HMOs
practice medicine in an outpatient rather than an inpatient
setting, and emphasize preventative medicine and wellness.
Primary care doctors are generally among the lowest paid
specialists, but are in the highest demand by HMOs and the
rest of the health care industry [Ref. 11].
In the private sector, GME is heavily subsidized by
Medicare. In 1995, Medicare spent nearly $7 billion to
assist teaching hospitals in training residents [Ref. 12].
Through Medicare, the government recognized the additional
costs that teaching hospitals incurred to train physicians.
Medicare subsidizes teaching hospitals to train physicians.
However, Medicare must also respond to changes in the
health care market place relative to GME; it has been slow
to change. Until the recently passed Balanced Budget Act of
1997 (BBA) , Medicare payments to teaching hospitals provided
incentives to train specialists in hospital settings rather
than primary care physicians in outpatient settings [Ref.
13] .
B. MILITARY GME
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the three military
departments recognized the importance of maintaining a
trained cadre of specialists who were able to deploy world-
wide. They also recognized the difficulty of recruiting and
retaining highly educated professionals into military
occupations which pay substantially less than the private
sector. Figure 1.2 compares the average annual salaries of
an 0-5 board certified physician with 8 years of service and
a 4 year commitment with their civilian physician
counterparts [Ref. 14]
.
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SALARY COMPARISON
Specialty Military Civilian Difference
Surgery $125,371 $233,800 $108,429
Radiology $128,371 $229,800 $101,429
Obstetrics/Gynecology $130,371 $221,800 $91,429
Anethesiology $120,371 $211,100 $90,729
Pathology $112,371 $197,700 $85,329
Internal Medical $112,371 $149, 600 $37,229
Psychiatry $109,371 $127, 600 $18,229
Pediatrics $106,371 $119,300 $12,929
General/Family $111,371 $111,500 $129
Figure 1.2
SOURCE: NAVY TIMES (13 JANUARY 1997)
After cancelling the draft in 1972, the Uniformed
Services University of. Health Sciences (USUHS) was created
to provide DOD a cadre of career medical officers; the Armed
Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (AFHPSP) was
created to provide the majority of DOD' s physicians who
would not be career medical officers [Ref . 15]
.
However, DOD' s principal tool in recruiting and
maintaining a trained cadre of medical officers is military
sponsored GME programs. The three services created and
maintained GME programs in many specialties following World
War II. These programs are accredited by the ACGME in the
same manner as civilian programs.
DOD has maintained a firm financial commitment to the
GME mission. In FY 1994, 3,364 doctors were training in
military GME programs; an additional 1,672 physicians were
being trained through civilian GME programs. The total
estimated cost of GME in FY 1994 was $186 million [Ref . 16]
.
By the time military physicians complete their residency,
DOD has spent over $500,000 per physician [Ref. 17].
Following the end of the Cold War, all DOD activities
were scrutinized to justify their costs and functions under
the drastically reduced wartime requirements. The military
medical departments were included in these assessments. The
military medical departments are also subject to the same
pressures affecting the private sector health care industry;
DOD is implementing some of the same cost containment
policies that civilian employers look for in their health
insurance plans [Ref. 18]. As a result, all military
medical department functions, including GME, must be
justified by either mission requirement, i.e. readiness, or
cost-effectiveness
.
DOD' s primary readiness mission is the basis for its
medical cadre. In the Navy, doctors in GME programs
typically complete an internship year. Then they spend two
years providing acute medical care to active duty Navy and
Marine Corps personnel deployed throughout the fleet. This
is unique to the military as these non-board certified
doctors serve in the fleet as general medical officers
(GMO) , underseas medical officers (UMO) , or flight surgeons
(FS) . These doctors typically complete their residency
programs following their utilization tours in the fleet;
their counterparts in the civilian sector have continued on
in their residency programs.
DOD also provides a secondary peacetime benefit mission
to compensate active duty personnel and maintain the skills
of its physicians and surgeons. This peacetime benefit
provides free health care in MTFs to eligible non-active
duty beneficiaries, such as active duty family members/
retirees, retiree family members, and survivors. This care
is provided on a space available basis.
Although the readiness and benefit missions require the
usual mix of medical specialties, the secondary benefit
mission uses many specialties which are not readiness
essential. Some argue that these specialities should be
directly provided on a pure cost/benefit basis; others
contend that the GMOs, FSs, and UMOs will only undertake
these readiness roles if they can anticipate completing
residency programs in the specialties required for the
benefit mission. This view holds that the readiness mission
cannot exist apart from the benefit mission.
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C . PROBLEM
Military GME is a costly system for training physicians
and surgeons. It is considered to be very important inside
the military medical profession. However, its current size
and scope are difficult to defend in an era demanding
increased efficiency in all aspects of military operations.
D. OBJECTIVES
This thesis will review the history of military GME and
examine in detail contemporary issues and factors affecting
its size and scope (number of doctors and specialty mix) .
Some of the factors are unique to DOD, others are unique to
the civilian health care industry, but many factors are
common to both DOD and the civilian sector. As
controversial and politically sensitive as the GME issue is
in the military, it cannot be adequately addressed without
considering events and issues affecting GME in the civilian
sector. This thesis will also examine a GME restructuring





What are the policy, fiscal, and operational
implications for military GME associated with the end of the
Cold War and the subsequent reduction in the United States
Armed Forces?
Why do the military services consider GME to be so
important, particularly for physician recruitment and
retention purposes, that each service undertakes an
inservice GME mission?
What internal DOD factors, civilian sector
developments, or issues common to both are changing GME
policy and the organization of GME operations in the
Military Health Services System (MHSS)
?
What are the current policy directions for military GME
and what operational models support this policy direction?
What is the funding mechanism for military GME under a
capitated managed health care system?
What is the likely future size and scope of military
GME?
F. SCOPE
This research examines the full time inservice GME
programs conducted by the Navy Medical Department.
Significant DOD policies affecting Navy GME, relevant
12
integration issues involving the Army and Air Force, and
historical developments in the Army GME programs will be
discussed.
This thesis assumes that events in the civilian health
care sector will have significant impacts on DOD GME issues.
The vast majority of GME is conducted outside the military,
and military GME programs are accredited in the same manner
as the civilian programs.
G. METHODOLOGY
Interviews were conducted with personnel from the
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
(OASD(HA)), the Naval School of Health Sciences Directorate
for Medical Corps Professional Programs, the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (N-931C) , the National Capital
Military Medical Education Consortium (NCMMEC) , the
Associate Dean for GME at the USUHS, the Medical Historian
at the USUHS, the Advisor to the Commander for GME of the
David Grant Air Force Medical Center at Travis AFB, CA, and
surgical personnel at the National Naval Medical Center
(NNMC) at Bethesda, MD. Instructions and regulations
governing GME in DOD and the three military medical
departments were reviewed and analyzed. Periodical articles
dealing with GME and contemporary civilian health care
13
issues were also reviewed and analyzed, as were relevant
congressional testimony and press releases from the DOD, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) , and the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of HHS.
H. CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter II will provide an extensive history of events
leading to the creation and maintenance of military GME
programs prior to the end of the Cold War.
Chapter III will discuss events and issues relating to
the maintenance of military GME programs since the end of
the Cold War. The chapter will also describe events in the
private sector affecting both civilian and military GME,
such as the BBA and the proposed Consumer Bill of Rights.
Chapter IV outlines DOD policies, operational
restructuring models, and funding provisions impacting
military GME.
Chapter V will synthesize and analyze issues and
concerns relative to the future size and scope of military
GME.
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II. HISTORICAL TRENDS AFFECTING GME: PRE-1989
A. INTRODUCTION
Military GME is a costly system of training physicians
and surgeons. Unfortunately, GME's importance is not easily
understood outside of the military medical profession,
especially by individuals charged with scrutinizing budgets
in an era demanding increased efficiency in all aspects of
military operations. The importance of military GME and its
implications in a post Cold War medical system can only be
fully appreciated or understood by first considering the
historical events and trends explaining why the services
established a military GME mission. This chapter presents
historical trends affecting GME prior to the end of the Cold
War, with particular emphasis on the interval between World
War II and the Korean Conflict.
B. EARLY MILITARY MEDICAL TRAINING PROGRAMS
The formal teaching of medical officers begins in the
18 th century. John Warren's instruction to medical officers
in anatomy and surgery achieved such great success that he
was asked by the Harvard University trustees to start a
medical school following the Revolutionary War. Today,
15
Harvard University Medical School is the top medical school
in the country [Ref . 19]
.
The first authorized program for military GME was
established in the early 19th century. The program was
developed by Thomas Harris at the Philadelphia Naval
Hospital and ran from 1823 to 1843. The Brooklyn Navy Yard
also developed schools in the late 1890' s to train doctors
in military medicine/ emphasizing bacteriology. The Army
established a similar program in Washington, D.C.
C. "FEAST OR FAMINE"
The American people have proven to be extremely
patriotic in times of war and national emergencies. In such
circumstances, American citizens from all occupations,
including physicians, surgeons, nurses, and other medical
personnel, volunteer or are drafted to assist in the various
campaigns. The federal budget and domestic economy shift to
reflect wartime priorities. For the military, this time is
known as feast; the military has the money, manpower,
equipment, and technology to accomplish the specific
mission.
The more troubling trend affecting military GME is the
famine trend. The American public is reluctant to maintain
wartime military scope and strength in terms of personnel,
16
money, and manpower following a major war or conflict. The
first signs of peace or reduction in hostilities usually
initiate discussions to cut back military strength [Ref.
20] .
Following World War I, the military medical departments
experienced this trend. H. W. Smith, a career Navy medical
officer, observed, "Following demobilization, we were
literally unable to secure candidates for appointment in the
Medical Corps although the vital importance of Afresh blood'
was recognized and every effort was made to introduce
desirable young men into the Navy." [Ref. 21]
This famine trend was even more evident following World
War II. In December 1947, the Army Medical Department was
authorized 3,000 Regular Army Medical Corps billets, but the
actual personnel numbered 1,206 [Ref. 22]. Furthermore,
special rules had to be implemented to retain physicians on
active duty. During congressional hearings in 1947, General
of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower summarized this problem as
"one of the hardest...we have got in the Army... we have fewer
doctors today in the Army, in the Regular Service, including
the ones who have recently accepted commissions, than we did
when the war started. " [Ref . 23] He further characterized
this problem as requiring "more planning, more brains...than
almost anything I can think of." [Ref. 24]
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D. GENERAL PRACTICE TO SPECIALTY PRACTICE
Military doctors had traditionally practiced generalist
medicine; providing medical care for all types of injuries,
illnesses and conditions. Until the early part of the 20th
century, most doctors completed medical school and went
directly into medical practice, with no supervised training
by qualified, experienced practitioners.
However, at the turn of the century, certain doctors in
the military were specializing, meaning that these
practitioners had specific skills or were in some way
limiting their practice to such specialized areas as general
surgery. With the release of the Flexner Report in 1910,
one to two year internships were established. Trainees
completing the internship would typically practice as
generalists [Ref . 25] . By the beginning of World War I,
fifteen states required an internship to receive medical
licensure. In 1919, the Army and Navy met the published
requirements for an American Medical Association (AMA)
approved internship.
The internship process for general practitioners
eventually led to the residency and fellowship programs for
specialty training. The American College of Surgeons (ACS)
required certification of practical experience, both with a
mentor and in independent practice for a fellowship. In
18
1928, the AMA published standards for an approved residency
program. In the 1930' s, the Advisory Board of Medical
Specialties was established and set inter-specialty
standards for training; specifically, three years of post-
internship training in an AMA approved residency program
[Ref. 26].
In 1933, the Navy Surgeon General, RADM Rossiter,
committed the Navy Medical Department to meeting the
civilian Advisory Board of Medical Specialties GME standards
[Ref. 27] . This furthered the precedent that civilian
professional organizations would set the standards; military
medicine would follow these standards. Therefore, military
medicine, with its unique specialties and environment, could
not exist independent of the civilian health care sector,
particularly for quality of care and recruitment and
retention reasons.
In 1938, the ACS developed rigorous standards of
training in surgery. The Advisory Board of Medical
Specialties began extending residency training, and many
teaching hospitals began using a pyramid residency system,
which meant fewer and fewer residents would proceed to the
next residency stages. Despite the fact that the AMA
believed few doctors would become specialists, due to the
19
intense training, research interests and progress in
specialty medicine encouraged more physicians to specialize.
The military could not offer training in all
specialties, but definitely had a need in some areas. Thus,
the military had the incentive to provide specialty training
to competitively recruit and possibly retain physicians and
surgeons. In 1929, the Navy Medical Department established
a postgraduate medical board to evaluate the need for
certain specialties and to prioritize the programs. Their
medical officers were trained in the civilian sector [Ref.
28]. The Navy's most immediate needs were specialists in
aviation and submarine medicine, and the non-medical
specialties including chemistry and sanitation.
Even though specialization was becoming more common
during the Great Depression years, the military was still
practicing generalist medicine for the most part. According
to BG Sam F. Seeley, USA, "You wouldn't believe it, but in
the thirties until I left Walter Reed in 1939, we of the
Medical Corps of the Army were not specializing." [Ref. 29]
World War II was the single event which sold the
military on the importance of specialists. As America's
involvement in World War II became more inevitable, the
military realized that some specialties were absolutely
crucial. To be adequately prepared for war and staff
20
hospitals simultaneously, specialists in general surgery,
preventive medicine, and general internal medicine were
clearly required.
As America entered World War II, doctors entered the
military in great numbers. Approximately 40 percent of the
available doctors were serving in the military, which had
only 8 percent of America's population [Ref 30].
Some civilian GME academics entered the Armed Forces
serving in operational units or teaching GME specialties in
the military hospitals. The accomplishments of these
specialists caused the military to encourage specialization.
In 1944, Surgeon General, RADM Mclntire, formally introduced
residency training in naval hospitals [Ref. 31].
E. RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION PROBLEMS
The key contemporary issue of physician recruitment and
retention surfaced following World War I. In 1923, the
number of available internship positions exceeded the number
of medical graduates for the first time, giving the medical
graduates numerous options to complete their required
internship. After the war, it was increasingly difficult
for the Army and the Navy to recruit physicians for the
Medical Corps. Military medicine had many associated
disadvantages, including separation from family and the
21
practice of generalist medicine; most doctors were inclined
to specialize.
In 1925, the Navy began commissioning interns in
civilian residencies in the Naval Reserve as Lieutenants
(Junior Grade) . These doctors incurred an obligation to
serve in the active forces following completion of their
internship, thus helping the Navy in its efforts to
initially recruit physicians. However, retaining these
physicians after their obligated service became a problem
for the Navy and Army Medical departments; most doctors were
resigning their commissions.
Formal specialization gained strength during the Great
Depression. At the same time, physicians' and surgeons'
incomes were falling. Therefore, recruiting and retaining
medical officers became easy enough that the Army abandoned
its internship training program in 1937 [Ref . 32]
.
World War II was long, extensive, and costly for the
American people and the military. At its conclusion, the
top priority of the American government was demobilization.
This included the medical departments. These service members
were anxious, like most civilians drafted into military
service, to get back into civilian life, particularly back
into medical practice.
22
The military medical departments had serious difficulty
retaining quality medical officers. It was the "feast or
famine" phenomenon revisited, but medical officers leaving
the service had some insights to offer. These officers
cited many disadvantages ranging from professional
assignments, inequitable pay compared to the civilian
sector, and poor living conditions [Ref 33]
.
However, the most cited reason for leaving the military
services was professional. MG Norman Kirk, the Army Surgeon
General, described this situation: "Much of the
unwillingness of the young physician to enter military
service is due to his belief that the Army denies to
him..opportunities for professional advancement, postgraduate
education, for clinical specialization, for certification by
professional specialty boards, and for clinical research and
self expression." [Ref. 34]
The Society of United States Medical Consultants in
World War II agreed, noting that, "The concept of the Army
Medical officer as a general practitioner, capable of doing
medicine, surgery, and certain specialties, and trained in
military medicine as well...is wholly against the trend of the
times, and if the {Medical} Corps set this up as an
objective it would be impossible to induce good men to make
Army Medicine a career." [Ref. 35]
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The AMA' s military recruitment drive is a prime example
of the apathy among civilian doctors. In 1948, the AMA sent
letters to every physician under the age of 26 (7,610
letters) , with particular wording to individuals who had
incurred obligations during World War II, encouraging them
to join the military for two years. A total of 33
physicians joined the military in response. [Ref. 36]
A major concern for the military medical departments
was the guality of medical department officers who either
remained on active duty or who wished to join the medical
departments. For example, 210 nurses were polled in June
1946 about their interest in an Army career. Only 15
expressed interest; of those, 6 nurses had efficiency
ratings that prevented them from serving as career Army
nurses [Ref. 37] . Similar concerns existed for physicians
and dentists.
F. WORLD WAR II ISSUES
The large influx of doctors during World War II had
significant ramifications for GME. Despite the large number
of doctors serving in the military, the military felt that
additional military officers were needed to fight the two
front war, particularly to turn the tide of the war in the
Pacific.
24
To meet this immediate personnel need, the Army began
training enlisted men in the Army Specialized Training
Program (ASTP) [Ref 38] . The comparable Navy program was
called the V-12 program. These programs, in part, provided
a future supply of physicians, dentists, and surgeons to
staff hospitals through their internships and residencies.
Following their GME training, they would serve as Medical
Corps officers in national emergencies. For qualified
candidates, the services paid the medical school tuition,
fees, and living expenses; the candidates incurred an
obligation to serve in the military in times of emergency.
When the V-12 and ASTP medical programs ended in June 1946,
over 13,000 physicians were trained and had fixed three year
obligations [Ref. 39] . At that time, the supply of
physicians was so great that the obligated service was
reduced to two years
.
G. BETWEEEN WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN CONFLICT
The most significant time in the history of military
GME occurred during the interval between World War II and
the Korean Conflict. The men who incurred obligations under
the ASTP and V-12 programs were typically eager to serve




Something had to be done to recruit and retain quality
medical department personnel. This became even more crucial
as most of the medical officers would complete their
obligated service in 1948. The military leaders could not
offer better pay than the civilian sector, much less provide
better living conditions. It was felt that training,
particularly GME training leading to specialty
certification, was inseparable from medical officer
procurement [Ref. 41]. Given the problems the civilian
residency programs experienced when military officers were
removed to serve in World War II, the answer was clearly
military GME.
The Navy began its residency programs in December 1945;
by November 1946 there were over 200 approved residencies in
naval hospitals in many diversified specialties. By
September 1948, the Navy produced 157 board-certified
specialists [Ref. 42]
.
The Army's residency programs were established in 1947.
By the middle of 1948, 376 residents were in training in
five Army teaching hospitals. In 1948, the Army also began
commissioning residents in civilian hospitals [Ref. 43].
Establishing military GME residencies was absolutely
essential for other retention reasons. There was a
significant demand for civilian medical personnel, and there
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was a shortage of residency training positions in the
civilian sector. This gave the military a recruitment
vehicle for physicians who wished to specialize. The
military offered GME training billets and a stable
population for practice; the trainees owed the military a
year of obligated service for every year of training the
military provided. Career military medical officers were
also encouraged to obtain postgraduate education. GME gave
first priority to training career medical officers who would
eventually become the teachers in the military GME teaching
hospitals.
What further solidified the case for inservice GME was
the comparative performance of the military GME trained
residents and specialists in the Korean Conflict. It became
obvious that the civilian doctors were not properly trained
in basic military functions, and generally performed poorly
when they were mobilized for service [Ref. 44]. As the
conflict stabilized, the military decided that all personnel
from military and civilian residencies should receive some
basic military training; the military GME residents would be
mobilized before the civilian GME residents, for practical
as well as political reasons.
Another incentive for doctors to join the military was
less successful than the GME programs. The Army-Navy Public
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Health Service Medical Officer Procurement Act (Public Law
365) was approved on 5 August 1947. Public Law 365 tried to
reduce the gap in the civilian and military pay by offering
medical officers an extra $100 per month for switching from
reserves to the regular Army and Navy [Ref . 45] .
1950 was another year of famine. The military was
under pressure to curtail some of the GME programs. The
Army was forced to eliminate civilian residencies/ cut
military residencies by 245, and shrink the civilian and
military internships [Ref 46]
.
On 25 June 1950, when the North Koreans crossed the
38 th parallel, the Army had to mobilize all residents and
interns, an inadequate number, with many having no formal
military training. Due to the severe shortage of doctors at
the beginning of the Korean Conflict, the Congress passed
Public Law 779 on 9 September 1950, also known as the Doctor
Draft [Ref. 47] . This action included young physicians who
had not served during World War II and had paid for their
own education. This again made a strong case for
maintaining military GME programs.
The interval between World War II and the Korean
Conflict featured many other legislative and executive
matters which profoundly affected the military and the
military medical departments. Prior to passage of the
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National Security Act of 1947, congressional hearings
centered on unifying the military services and their medical
departments. The military medical departments were
criticized for excessive costs, duplication of effort during
World War II, and underutilizing doctors during the war
[Ref . 48] . Among the chief supporters of unification was
General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his Surgeon
General, MG Norman Kirk.
The National Security Act was signed on 26 July 1947
and took effect on 18 September 47. Rather than unify the
services, this act created the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
and separate service secretaries for the Army, Navy, and the
new Air Force. The first SECDEF was Mr. James Forrestal.
Forrestal's first significant action relating to the
military medical departments occurred on 1 January 1948. He
created the Committee on Medical and Hospital Services in
the Armed Forces. The group became known as the Hawley
Board, after its chair, MG Paul B. Hawley, USA (Ret) . The
group consisted of the two Surgeons General, MG Raymond W.
Bliss, USA and RADM Clifford W. Swanson, MC, USN, as well as
the new Air Force top medical officer MG Malcolm C. Grow,
USAF (the Air Force Medical Service wasn't established until
September 1949) . RADM Joel T. Boone, MC, USN, served as the
Executive Secretary for the board.
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The Hawley Board was commissioned to study all
questions of common interest to the three medical services.
Their objective was to obtain maximum efficiency and economy
in the short term by coordinating military hospital
construction projects, efficiently utilizating military
medical treatment facilities (MTF) , coordinating medical
training programs, centralizing services, etc [Ref. 49].
The Hawley Board was strongly influenced by its two
principal members, MG Hawley and MG Bliss. MG Hawley had
very strong beliefs regarding military medicine. He
believed that the military medical establishment could be
greatly reduced without interupting service. He felt is was
appropriate to unify the three services' medical
departments, and that the services used hospitals to train
too many specialists. He felt it was more appropriate to
obtain personnel from the civilian sector during wartime as
had been done in the past [Ref. 50]
.
MG Bliss disagreed with MG Hawley on the level and
extent of unification versus coordination. MG Bliss's
predecessor, MG Kirk, supported unifying the services, as
did General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower
was now retired. MG Bliss viewed military medicine as
completely different from civilian medicine and believed
that the military needed more doctors per patient than the
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civilian sector. He believed a ratio of 6 doctors per 1,000
troops was a proper ratio as opposed to the civilian ratio
of 1 doctor per 1,000 patients [Ref. 51].
MG Hawley was disgusted with the committee. "It was,"
he said, "a waste of time and money. I say to you frankly
that, in the committee which I headed was a colossal display
of bad faith." [Ref. 52] MG Hawley never traveled with the
group to visit MTFs and continued with his civilian
practice. In January 1949, he resigned and MG Bliss took
over as chair of the Hawley Board.
Under the helm of MG Bliss, the Hawley Board was
parochial, minimizing civilian involvement in the process of
setting policy for military medicine. The Hawley Board only
proposed minor reforms, including joint centers for
diagnosing special conditions, experiments in joint
staffing, a permanent committee to report to SECDEF,
downgrading some hospitals to clinics and closing others,
providing care for dependents regardless of parent service,
and having each service maintain its own headquarters [Ref.
53] .
In 1948, another group examined military health issues.
The President's Commission on Reorganization of the
Executive Branch became known as the Hoover Commission,
because former President Herbert Hoover headed the panel.
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The Hoover Commission chartered two separate, but equally
important, committees to evaluate military health care
matters. The Task Force on National Security, known as the
Eberstadt Committee, and the Task Force on Federal Medical
Services, known as the Voorhees Committee [Ref. 54].
The Voorhees Committee accepted three separate military
medical services. The committee wanted to transfer control
over stateside hospitals from the military to a proposed
National Board of Health. The committee also recommended a
single medical supply system, single service responsibility
for medical care in overseas areas, reductions in dependant
care, curtailment of postgraduate training programs, and
transferring GME training for Armed Forces specialists to
non-military federal facilities [Ref. 55].
The Eberstadt Committee reached similar findings for
military medicine. The committee concluded that service
estimates for medical and dental needs were excessive and
found military doctors unsatisfactory. The committee also
concluded that the military's assistance to the Veterans'
Administration (VA) hospitals and dependent care contributed
to the shortage of military doctors. The committee also
questioned whether the emphasis on specialty training and




Acting on recommendations from both committees, the
Hoover Commission believed that the military medical
departments should only provide field services. The
commission also recommended that SECDEF establish a civilian
committee to advise the SECDEF on health and medical matters
[Ref. 57].
The military medical departments' response was
predictable, given problems in recruiting and retaining
doctors. The services obviously believed that no one would
join the military to perform field services. MG Bliss
characterized the Hoover Commission recommendations as
events which would lead the military medical departments to
be "a service of mediocrity. " [Ref. 58]
On 9 November 1948, SECDEF acted on the Hoover
Commission recommendation to appoint a civilian consulting
body. He created the Armed Forces Medical Advisory
Committee. This committee became known as the Cooper
Committee, after its chairman Mr. Charles P. Cooper. It was
primarily concerned with increasing efficiency and economy
in the government by eliminating waste and duplication
through centralization. The committee membership included
MG Hawley, Dr. Michael DeBakey, and CAPT Paul Titus, USN
(Ret) . (Capt Titus had been particularly instrumental in
persuading the Navy Surgeon General to begin GME programs in
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Navy hospitals in 1944) . The committee originally included
the military Surgeons General [Ref . 59]
.
In 1949, the Joint Staff recommended that the Cooper
committee study the "unification and coordination" of the
military medical departments, including possibly developing
a "single medical service." [Ref. 60] The Cooper Committee
realized that it had no mechanism to enforce its
recommendations. Therefore, its first major recommendation
was to establish an office in the SECDEF organization to
implement the committee recommendations. This office would
supersede the need for a single medical service. In May
1949, the new SECDEF, Mr. Louis Johnson, established the
Medical Services Division in his office. Furthermore, he
disestablished the Hawley Board on 1 July 1949. This
action was extremely significant. The Surgeons General were
removed from the Cooper Committee earlier in the year, thus
making the only SECDEF medical advisory board an entirely a
civilian body [Ref. 61].
Dr. Raymond B. Allen was the first Director of the
Medical Services Division. The director was delegated the
authority by SECDEF to establish general policies and
programs for the medical services of the three departments
and to exercise general direction and control over personnel
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and facilities. He also established a medical advisory
council consisting of the Surgeons General.
In October 1949, Dr. Allen resigned and was succeeded
by another Cooper Committee member, Dr. Richard Meiling.
Dr. Meiling reorganized the division. The division became
the Office of Medical Services; Dr. Meiling became Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Medical Affairs [Ref . 62] .
On 2 January 1951, the new SECDEF, George C. Marshall,
combined the duties of the Cooper Committee and the Office
of Medical Services by chartering the Armed Forces Medical
Policy Council (AFMPC) . This body was the sole coordinating
entity for DOD health care and medical policy, and would
serve as DOD' s interface in health and medical matters with
government agencies, civilian medical and allied health
agencies, and professional organizations. The Surgeons
General were also a part of this council; they had the
authority to represent their departments in formulating
health and medical policy at the DOD level.
In 1951, the President also created the Health and
Resources Advisory Committee; a former Cooper Committee
member, Dr. Howard Rusk, was appointed as the chairman. The
Rusk Committee was primarily concerned with an eguitable
distribution of the nation's health resources, particularly
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medical personnel. The Rusk Committee operated separately
from the AFMPC, although they had similar interests.
The AFMPC became actively interested in the career
aspects of military service for medical personnel: the
problems of recruiting medical personnel, developing a
uniform Reserve program, and developing a nucleus of trained
medical personnel.
On 3 September 1953, Dr. Frank B. Berry, a retired Army
Colonel, became the second Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health and Medical) . On 1 January 1954, the AFMPC was
rechartered; once again the Surgeons General were
eliminated, along with the Surgeon General of the Public
Health Service and the Medical Director of the VA. More
significantly, Dr. Berry initiated what became the Armed
Forces Medical Officer Commission and Residency
Consideration Program. Under this plan, doctors who owed
service under the Doctor Draft of 1950, 1951, 1952, or 1954
could apply for a deferment until they had completed their
residency training. This allowed for continuously training
doctors while providing the military gualified medical
specialists [Ref. 63].
The AFMPC built a closer relationship between military
and civilian medicine. Both parties developed a clearer
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perspective on their mutual interests and responsibilities
which broadened the spectrum of military medicine [Ref . 64]
.
H. PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT ISSUES FOLLOWING KOREA
The next troubling issue affecting military GME
concered procuring doctors in the late 1960's and early
1970' s. Military doctors had to serve in Vietnam and
overseas and provide for a growing dependent care mission.
In 1970/ over 14,000 doctors were serving in the military;
66 percent were serving as draftees fulfilling selective
service obligations or as "volunteers" fulfilling residency
obligations. These doctors left the military when their
obligations were complete. 38 percent of the remaining 34
percent left the military following their first tour of
duty. Of these remaining doctors, 60 percent left after
their second tour of duty; the next great exodus was at the
20-year mark. So after two tours of duty, the number of
military physicians would fall to 12.6 percent of the number
in 1970 [Ref. 65] . This was a critical problem as the draft
ended in 1972.
The Uniformed Services Health Professions
Revitalization Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-426) was enacted
to deal with this Vietnam-era problem of physician
procurement and retention. Some medical officers become
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career military medical officers (studies had demonstrated
that medical officers with twelve or more years in service
would stay the full 20 years); and some do not. The 1972 law
dealt with both types of physician procurement issues.
The law established the AFHPSP, tailored for
individuals were not expected to be career military
officers. The program paid medical school tuition and fees
as well as a monthly stipend for civilian medical school
students. Upon completing medical school, the trainees
entered GME training at the 0-3 paygrade, attended the
Combat Casualty Care Course (C-4) for readiness training,
and successfully completed the United States Medical
Licensing Exam.
In return, the trainees owed an obligation equal to the
number of years sponsored by the scholarship, but not less
than two (not including time spent in GME training) .
Additionally, the scholarship students served on active duty
for 45 days every year during medical school. At this time
they attended basic training and performed clerkships in
MTFs.
Scholarship students were classified as deferred or
regular. Regular scholarship students underwent GME
training at military teaching hospitals and had an average
retention of 9.8 years following training. Deferred
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scholarship students completed their GME training at a
civilian institution and had an average retention of 5.3
years following GME training [Ref . 66]
.
The 1972 law also established the USUHS at Bethesda,
Maryland. The USUHS medical school is called the F. Edward
Hebert School of Medicine and is named after the Louisiana
Representative who led the fight to establish the
university. This university was intended to provide DOD
with a group of career military physicians. These
prospective doctors were commissioned and entered active
duty at the 0-1 paygrade. After completing medical school,
they were guaranteed selection for a military GME program,
did not participate in the NRMP, and owed a seven year
active duty obligation, not including the time spent in GME
training.
Physician procurement through the USUHS is the more
expensive of the two options and has been the subject of
constant scrutiny. However, given the 4 years of active
duty required to finish USUHS during medical school, the 3
years in a typical residency program (not counting the years
as a GMO, FS, or UMO) , and the seven year obligation, it is
not very surprising the that the retention rate for the
USUHS graduate is 18.5 years [Ref. 67]. Therefore, it
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definitely provides the career medical officer cadre for
which it was intended.
Some similarities exist between AFHPSP and UHUHS
students. Upon completion of the internship, most doctors
become GMOs on ships or in field units, FSs with Marine and
Navy squadrons or on carriers, or UMOs on submarine tenders.
These operational tours fulfill a year of obligated service
for every year served.
After completing two year tours, the doctors are
encouraged to apply for specialty GME programs and are given
priority in selection. The selected individuals complete
GME training leading to specialty certification, and owe on
obligation equal to the greater of the years of residency
training received or the unexpired obligation from medical
school. Individuals further selected for fellowships incur
a year for year obligation in addition to any existing
obligation [Ref. 68].
I. THE LATE 1980'
S
The late 1980' s were characterized by dramatically
increasing costs in health care [Ref. 69] . The military
departments were not exempt from this phenomenon. The
dependent and retiree population grew rapidly.
Specialization required a broad patient base, and the 600
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ship Navy required maintaining a broad mix of specialists.
GME was seen as the cornerstone behind this effort.
The most significant event for Navy GME in the late
1980s was the 1988 Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) on Navy Medicine.
The panel concluded that Navy Medicine must focus in-house
capability to optimally use the MTF to control ever
increasing health care costs. Most notably, the panel
concluded that Navy Medicine must make GME its top priority,
even at the expense of not meeting all operational and
overseas requirements. This included establishing personnel
policies to properly man GME teaching hospitals and
developing compensation packages to attract and retain the
best clinicians and teachers [Ref . 70]
.
In 1989, the Chief of Naval Personnel, VADM J. M.
Boorda, increased internships for the first time in many
years. He further increased full time outservice billets
for residencies and fellowships [Ref. 71]. These outservice
GME programs involve active duty doctors completing
residencies or fellowships in undermanned specialities at
civilian institutions. This is different than a deferred
AFHPSP resident, because the deferred resident doesn't come
on active duty until GME is completed. VADM Boorda also
authorized the Medical Officer Retention Bonus for eligible
officers in outservice or inservice GME training.
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J. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Many historical trends affected GME prior to the end of
the Cold War. The "feast or famine" trend indicates the
extent to which the American public and doctors are willing
to serve in wartime, but are not as willing during
peacetime. The trend of shifting medical care delivery from
general practice to specialty practice througout the 20 th
century had many ramifications for GME and the practice of
medicine in MTFs . Perhaps the greatest single event was the
outstanding contributions of specialists and academics
during World War II which put DOD on the road to specialty
care through military GME training.
Recruitment and retention trends illustrate the
difficulty of recruiting and retaining quality medical
professionals, particularly following wartime. Military GME
was used to help solve some of these problems. Physician
procurement and retention proved to depend on the
opportunity to become a board-certified specialist, and the
military provided residencies and fellowships to accomplish
that end.
The interval between World War II and the Korean
Conflict largely shaped much of the present MHSS and GME.
The Army-Navy Public Health Service Medical Officer
Procurement Act of 1947 sought to close the military and
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civilian pay gap. However, the most important incentives to
retain doctors on active duty were the GME training
programs.
The work of the Hawley Board showed the political,
parochial nature of the military medical departments. The
Hoover Commission's Eberstadt and Voorhees Committees
clearly expressed the popular belief that military medicine
was overstaffed, overspecialized, and was overtraining
specialists in MTFs. Furthermore, these committees
recommended that military medicine should be unified under
one service and relegated to practicing field medicine. The
military departments responded and cut back on training
opportunities. Then Korean Conflict demonstrated that a
ready, specialty trained medical cadre was essential to
mobilize for war. Military GME training programs best serve
this purpose.
The Cooper Committee instigated the AFMPC which formed
the basis for today's OASD(HA). This civilian council
became very aware of the similarities and differences
between military and civilian medical practice. This was
extremely beneficial for both sectors.
The Uniformed Services Public Health Professions
Revitalization Act of 1972 formed the basis for 93 percent
of today's medical officer procurement [Ref. 72]. The
43
AFHPSP provides most of the military's doctors; while the
USUHS produces most of the career medical officers.
The drive for a 600 ship Navy in the early and late
1980' s put GME clearly at the forefront of Navy Medicine.
Personnel policies were created or enhanced to ensure GME




III. EVENTS LEADING TO CHANGES IN MILITARY GME
A. INTRODUCTION
Military medicine faced a physician famine again
following the end of the Cold War. However, this was
different from previous famines. All facets of military
operations were under severe scrutiny as the threat of a
global conflict with the Soviet Union disappeared.
Consequently/ much of the personnel and infrastructure,
including MTFs, required to combat and deter the Soviet
threat and support the active duty forces were no longer
needed.
Many hard and politically sensitive decisions were made
during four rounds of base closure. Most bases that closed
also closed their MTFs, eliminating access to care for
beneficiaries remaining in the area. The DOD medical
establishment received intense scrutiny for not taking cuts
in personnel and funding in proportion to the combat forces
[Ref . 73] . This scrutiny came despite the fact that 35
percent of the MTFs open in 1987 were closed by 1991, with
only a nine percent reduction in the DOD eligible
beneficiary population [Ref. 74]
.
In the civilian sector, health care costs continued to
rise. The HMO was also emerging as an insurance and health
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care delivery system which seemed to contain these
increasing costs.
Many events took place following the Cold War which
were unique to DOD, unique to the civilian health care
sector, and common to both, all of which had significant
direct and indirect effects on military GME . This chapter
focuses on these events.
B. PRIORITY SHIFT IN NAVY MEDICINE
The single most important event affecting military GME,
particularly Navy GME, was a shift in priority. In late
1988, the BRP concluded that GME would receive the top
priority in Navy Medicine, even over operational commitments
[Ref. 75]. The panel reasoned that physicians would be in
constant demand for a 600 ship Navy, and GME was the
recruitment and retention vehicle to manage the demand. In
late 1990, Operation Desert Shield resulted in some vacant
Navy GME positions, but cuts in GME positions and programs
were not planned [Ref. 76] .
Following Operation Desert Storm, there were major
uncertainties regarding the justification and allocation of
Navy medical resources and its dual mission priorities [Ref.
77] . By 1993, Navy medical education and training was
recognized as a support function providing the right number
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of personnel with the right skill sets to support
operational requirements [Ref . 78] . The readiness mission
was no longer subordinate to the GME mission; GME training
requirements had to be tied to readiness.
C. LEGISLATION, STUDIES, AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
Section 711 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1991
had a major impact on medical personnel endstrength. This
act specifically prohibited reducing military (and civilian)
health care personnel in DOD below the number of such
personnel serving on September 30, 1989. The law permitted
an exception if DOD certified to Congress that the number of
personnel to be reduced were in excess of current and
projected needs, and that the reduction would not increase
costs in the Civilian Health and Medical Program for the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) . DOD was also prohibited from
reducing the number of Navy active duty medical officers,
including nonphysicians, to below 12,510, unless DOD met the
same certification exception [Ref. 79] . Such a law makes
reducing the number of physicians an extremely difficult,
creative task, particularly with increasing civilian health
care sector costs.
A significant administrative action took place within
DOD on October 1, 1991. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald
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Atwood signed a memorandum which clarified DOD medical
functions under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health
Affairs) (ASD(HA)). The key provision of this decision
consolidated the medical department budgets and programming
responsibilities for Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
appropriations under the ASD(HA). However, this decision
didn't transfer the Military Personnel (MILPERS)
appropriation to OASD(HA) . Hence, it did not give ASD(HA)
total medical force management [Ref . 80] . Any DOD action
regarding military personnel issues, including increasing or
decreasing GME training billets, ultimately remains the
services' decision.
In 1993, the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) set the future
force structure for the Armed Forces. Military personnel
and infrastructure would be restructured to fight two
simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC) . This included
plans for a 34 6 ship Navy, much smaller than the 600 ship
Navy which drove pre-Cold War Navy GME requirements [Ref.
81] .
TRICARE was introduced in 1993, under Section 731 of
the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 and Section
8025 of the DOD Appropriations Act of 1994. This DOD-
sponsored health plan was designed to provide quality,
access, and value for active duty personnel, family members,
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and CHAMPUS eligible retirees. Specifically, the plan
offered two more options to the traditional fee for service
CHAMPUS program. The plan offered both an HMO and a
preferred provider option (PPO) for CHAMPUS eligible
beneficiaries. The PPO option gave beneficiaries discounts
on copayments if they used providers in the PPO networks
[Ref. 82].
The HMO option, TRICARE Prime, was the chief feature of
the TRICARE program. This option encouraged active duty and
CHAMPUS eligible members to enroll with MTF and civilian
primary care managers (PCM) . The PCMs serve as the first
point of contact and make all referrals to specialists for
their enrollees. This option was cheaper for family
members, but it imposed the most restrictions on enrollees.
This option was designed to contain rising health care
costs, which was a primary motivation for the service
chiefs' support [Ref. 83]
.
However, TRICARE Prime has several features which
impact GME. Prior to the HMO option, patients could see
specialists directly; under this option, the PCM refers the
patient to specialists when they deem it appropriate. This
usually results in non-primary care specialists receiving
fewer and fewer patients. It also results in fewer and
fewer patients available to train residents; however, the
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patients who do receive specialty referrals can be better
patients for GME training.
Secondly, the HMO option only applies to active duty
and CHAMPUS eligible family members. This means that the
one major beneficiary group not entitled to enroll in the
HMO option is Medicare eligible retirees, family members,
and survivors, who become ineligible for CHAMPUS at age 65
when they become eligible for Medicare. This has caused a
major political backlash from retiree groups and members of
Congress. It also potentially presents accreditation
problems for GME training programs which require a broad
spectrum of patients from all ages. Compounding this
problem is space availability in MTFs for non-enrollees
.
MTF' s capacity is first available to TRICARE PRIME
enrollees; Medicare eligible beneficiaries are the last in
priority of non-enrollees. With MTF budgets now allocated
based upon enrollees, the prospects for MTF space available
care for Medicare eligibles becomes more remote [Ref. 84].
The first major post Cold War study involving the
appropriate size of medical personnel was the 733 Study.
This study was directed by Section 733 of the National
Defense Authorization Acts of 1992 and 1993. The study
specifically sought to determine the size and composition of
the medical system needed to support the post Cold War era
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Armed Forces during war or lesser conflicts. It also
addressed adjustments in the medical system to enhance the
cost-effectiveness of peacetime medical benefits [Ref . 85]
.
The 733 Study concluded what many suspected;
requirements for medical care had declined significantly
from the Cold War requirements. Specifically, the study
concluded that only 33 percent of active duty physicians in
the FY 1999 program were needed to support the wartime
mission of two simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC)
;
only 50 percent of active duty physicians were needed for
the wartime requirement, training, rotation, and support
[Ref. 86] . This obviously means that fewer doctors must be
trained in GME programs. However, the study didn't specify
the appropriate number and types of specialties to be
trained.
The study also concluded that care provided in the MTFs
was cheaper on average than care provided under CHAMPUS.
However, if the CHAMPUS system were absorbed by the MTF
system, the study concluded that the overall costs of
medical care would rise. This overall rise in medical care
costs would result from a rise in utilization by CHAMPUS
eligible beneficiaries. The beneficiaries would gain
greater access to the MTF; previously they did not use
CHAMPUS or the MTF. This "ghost" population, as well as the
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eligible beneficiaries who used CHAMPUS, would seek free MTF
care available with increased access. They would use the
MTF in higher proportions than either group used CHAMPUS.
The net result of this scenario was that the MTF cost
advantage would be more than offset by the increased
utilization rates from CHAMPUS users and the "ghost"
population [Ref. 87].
The second major study involving the size of medical
personnel was issued by the Commission on Roles and Missions
(CORM) . The CORM recognized that the peacetime medical
establishment was larger than needed to support wartime
readiness requirements. The CORM supported increasing
access to private sector medical care [Ref. 88] . The CORM
suggested considering MTF user fees. The CORM offered three
basic options for sizing the medical infrastructure:
continue the status quo, cut the medical force by 50
percent, or cut the medical force by 75 percent [Ref. 89] .
Each option also had a subset option of charging MTF user
fees
.
The CORM reiterated that operational readiness is the
top medical priority. They recommended that DOD emphasize
the importance of medical support to military operations and
establish uniform procedures for sizing DOD operational
needs [Ref. 90] . The results of the CORM were much the same
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as the 733 Study: it recommended drastic cuts in medical
personnel, meaning fewer personnel would be trained in GME
programs. However, it again failed to estimate the
appropriate mix of physicians needed in the MHSS.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 also had
a provision related to the size of the medical force
structure. The provision was motivated by the OASD(HA)
response to the CORM and the military medical departments'
plans for wartime force structure developed in response to
the 733 Study. Section 745 of that Act directed an
evaluation of the reasonableness of the military medical
departments' models used to develop each service's wartime
force level. Three working groups were formed to assist in
this study. The first group is concentrating on the
required wartime medical force structure. The second group
is examining the medical personnel needed as a sustainment
and training base to support wartime and operational
requirements. The third group is to analyzing the full cost
savings of the TRICARE program and considering other
options. One alternative is to offer the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Plan as a fourth option in TRICARE [Ref.
91] . The results of this follow on study have not been
released as of this writing.
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Another study issued by the DOD Inspector General dealt
with GME and readiness. This study concluded that medical
combat support units may not be able to adequately support
the active duty forces during wartime deployment.
Furthermore, MTF commanders were not able to accurately
determine whether staff physicians met medical readiness
requirements, such as attending C-4 and being certified in
Advanced Cardiac Life Support or Advanced Trauma Life
Support. The study also found that DOD and the services had
inadequate medical readiness guidance, GME programs lacked
comparability in medical readiness curricula, DOD did not
take full advantage of the readiness training opportunities
available to supplement GME programs, and DOD didn't have an
adequate system to record readiness training and monitor
physician readiness [Ref . 92]
.
For the Navy, the report indicated that 58 percent of
the full time inservice GME programs were defined as
readiness essential [Ref. 93]. Figure 3.1 lists
specialities and notes the specialties in which the Navy
offers full time inservice GME programs, and the specialties
which the Navy considers readiness essential [Ref. 94],
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NAVY GME PROGRAMS (INSERVICE AND READINESS ESSENTIAL)
Specialty GME Program Readiness Essential








Emergency Medicine X X
Endocrinology X
Family Practice X X
Gastroenterology X
General Surgery X X
Hematology/Oncology X
Infectious Disease X
















Transitional Internship X X
Urology X X
Figure 3.1
This study further noted that DOD may produce more
physicians than required to support readiness. It also
noted that DOD did not know which specialties were cost-
effective compared to other sources of GME training. The
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report suggested that DOD determine the number and types of
physicians required to support readiness, and size GME
programs to produce the necessary number of physicians.
Such methodologies should also identify, by medical
specialty and geographic region, those GME programs which
could be provided cost effectively in the MHSS [Ref . 95]
.
In May 1997, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was
released. The QDR intended to address all DOD functions,
including health care [Ref. 96] . It assumed that the DOD
budget would be stagnant for five years. In fact, the QDR
didn't address health care issues. Secretary of Defense
William Cohen may have reasoned that health care issues were
too complicated to be considered within the QDR' s time
constraints. In addition, the National Defense Panel was
expected to address health care issues later in 1997 [Ref.
97] .
In November 1997, the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI)
was released. The DRI's four basic goals were to eliminate
excess infrastructure, to compete many in-house functions
performed by DOD with the private sector, to consolidate
organizations to eliminate redundancies, and to adopt many
of the private sector's most effective management techniques
in DOD [Ref. 98]. The DRI didn't address health care
56
specifically, but all of the goals of the DRI have obvious
implications for the MHSS and GME
.
D. EMERGING TRENDS IN DOD HEALTH CARE
Given the legislative events, administrative actions,
and studies following the end of the Cold War, several
trends emerged which had implications for the MHSS and GME.
The first of these trends is a renewed emphasis on
readiness. All medical personnel and infrastructure in DOD
would first be evaluated in terms of their relevance for
readiness
.
The second trend was unification. Unification had been
addressed following World War II and again surfaced
following the Cold War. Many felt that a single Defense
Health Agency should be created [Ref . 99] . This obviously
didn't occur. However, transferring military medical O&M
funding from the services to ASD(HA) accomplished some
degree of unification, which impacted GME. For example, GME
training in DOD is funded by O&M, but both the training
billets that residents fill and the staff physicians who
teach GME are funded by the service's MILPERS appropriation.
This has the potential to create significant problems for
GME if DOD and the services disagree on the number and
specialty mix of GME trainees.
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The third trend is infrastructure reduction via base
closure. The QDR and DRI both called for additional rounds
of base closure which would involve closing MTFs on affected
bases and limiting access to care.
The fourth trend is privitization. DOD wants to use
readiness requirements as its core competancies . TRICARE is
an example where some of the peacetime health care provided
by MTFs can be privitized. Programs which can't be
accomplished cost effectively within DOD, including GME, are
to be considered for privitization. As previously noted,
DOD doesn't know which of its GME programs are cost
effective
.
Personnel cuts are the fifth trend. The 733 Study, the
CORM report, and the QDR all concluded that personnel cuts
were required. However, the 733 Study and the CORM report
weren't specific on the types of medical specialties to cut.
A sixth trend is that recent major DOD studies and
panels aimed at increased efficiency and economy are
unwilling to address DOD health care issues with any degree
of specificity.
The final trend, which cuts across all issues, is
politics. For example, Section 711 of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1991 prohibited DOD from cutting
medical personnel unless DOD could certify that these cuts
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would not increase CHAMPUS costs. Given the nature of
rising health care expenditures, it would be difficult to
prove that CHAMPUS cost increases were or weren' t related to
medical personnel cuts in MTFs . CHAMPUS costs would
probably rise anyway.
Another political issue, the TRICARE Prime option's
exclusion of Medicare eligible retiree enrollment, has drawn
congressional and public attention. This is extremely
significant considering that military retirees are active
voters and they now comprise 50 percent of the DOD eligible
population [Ref . 100] .
This exclusion has resulted in suits by retiree groups.
They claim that DOD broke a solemn pledge of free health
care for life [Ref. 101]. It also sparked interest in
Medicare Subvention. This policy would allow Medicare
eligible beneficiaries to enroll in TRICARE Prime. HCFA,
which administers Medicare, would reimburse DOD for all
costs provided to Medicare eligible beneficiaries above and
beyond what DOD normally spends on this group.
Unfortunately, DOD has no accurate account of how much it
normally spends on this group of retirees [Ref. 102] .
Nevertheless, Section 4015 of the BBA has authorized
Medicare Subvention demonstration projects in DOD.
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Recent quality of medical care issues have also
surfaced, which could have further political implications.
The Dayton Daily News ran stories on cases where military
doctors were negligent in treating patients, were not
licensed properly to practice medicine independently, held
special licenses which allowed practice in the military but
not in the state granting the medical license, or simply
failed their licensing exam on numerous occasions [Ref.
103] . Although these reports have drawn much attention in
the national media, it doesn't specifically highlight any
doctor who was trained in a military GME program.
DOD was also accused of not properly referring
physicians with privilege restrictions to the National
Practitioners Data Bank. Furthermore, DOD has also been
criticized for its lack of confidentiality regarding medical
records, which are the property of DOD and therefore not
confidential. DOD has drawn further criticism for the Feres
Doctrine, a 1950 Supreme Court ruling which prohibited
active duty and family members from suing military doctors
for malpractice involving an active duty patient. Even when
a dependent is the patient, a lawsuit can be filed against
the federal government, but not against the doctor [Ref.
104] .
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These highly visible reports on quality of DOD medical
care have cast serious doubts on DOD' s overall ability to
provide medical care. While GME is not singled out in these
stories, it cannot be helpful for GME programs where
accreditation is based mainly on quality.
E. OVERALL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES
As previously noted, health care expenditures have been
rising. Costs, which rose dramatically during the late
1980' s and early 1990' s, increased more slowly in the mid-
1990' s. For example, the national expenditure growth rates
for all federal and private health care expenditures in 1990
and 1991 were 10.5 and 11.4 percent, respectively. By 1994
and 1995, these growth rates were 6.4 and 5.5 percent,
respectively [Ref. 105]. Figure 3.2 shows national health
care expenditures from 1990 to 1995 [Ref. 106]
.
61
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES









Also interesting is the difference in the health care
spending growth rates between the public and private sector.
In 1990, private and public sector health care expenditures
grew at rates of 11.7 percent and 12.7, respectively; in
1995, the private and public sector health care expenditures
grew at rates of 2.9 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively
[Ref . 107] . Much of the decrease in health care expenditure
growth rates reflects the effects of managed care plans.
These plans emphasize cost containment and covered over half
of all Americans in 1995 [Ref. 108]
.
F. SHIFTS IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
In the 1990' s, private sector medicine has been
characterized by two notable shifts in health care delivery:
the shift from inpatient to outpatient care and the shift
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from specialty to primary care services. Both have
implications for GME training.
In the late 19 th and early 20 th century, medical and
surgical care was increasingly delivered in inpatient
settings, primarily to provide aseptic conditions.
Inpatient care dominated health care delivery throughout
most of the 20 th century. [Ref . 109] . The shift toward
outpatient care has occurred as a result of new
technologies, such as diagnostic procedures. This makes
services available in outpatient settings which were
previously available only in an inpatient setting.
Outpatient care eliminates the large overhead expenses of a
hospital or medical center [Ref. 110].
The shift from specialty care to primary care services
was noted by the Council on Graduate Medical Education
(COGME) in 1992. The COGME was authorized in 1986 to advise
the federal government and Congress on the distribution,
supply, and use of physicians. In 1992, the COGME
determined the following:
• the nation had too many specialists and too few
generalists (primary care physicians)
• shortages existed in the specialties of general
surgery, adult and child psychiatry, preventive
medicine, and generalist physicians with geriatric
training
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• the nation' s medical education system could be more
responsive to public needs for more generalists,
underrepresented minority physicians, and physicians
for medically underserved inner city and rural areas
[Ref . Ill]
.
In November 1995, the Pew Health Professions Commission
recommended that medical schools be reduced by 20 percent
over the next decade- This commission also predicted that
managed care would force physicians to work more
efficiently, eventually closing more than half of the
nation's hospitals [Ref. 112].
The current mix of physicians could have several
ramifications. The lack of primary care providers can
create access problems> particularly for those in inner city
and rural areas. The excess of specialists will probably
contribute to higher costs and unnecessary services.
Specialists may also be forced to perform primary care
medicine for which they aren't properly educated [Ref. 113].
G. MEDICARE GME
In 1983, Medicare recognized the importance of care in
teaching hospitals. More importantly, Medicare realized
that care in teaching hospitals is more costly to provide
than in non-teaching hospitals. Thus Medicare subsidies for
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teaching hospitals are calculated on two bases: direct
(DME) and indirect medical education (IME) costs.
DME costs include salaries and benefits for interns and
residents, supervisory teaching physician costs, and
overhead associated with operating a residency program.
These payments are made even if the residents and interns
are trained in an outpatient setting, as long as the
teaching hospital pays the interns' and residents' salaries.
The Medicare GME costs attributed to the DME payments have
grown from $1.3 billion in 1990 to $2.0 billion in 1995
[Ref . 114]
.
The largest portion of the Medicare GME costs is IME
payments. IME recognizes the higher costs of treating
patients in teaching hospitals. They are based on a ratio
of interns and residents to beds. Therefore, the higher the
intern and resident to bed ratio, the higher the IME
payments. According to the present formula, a 10 percent
increase in the resident and intern to bed ratio will cause
a 7.7 percent increase in the IME payments. IME payments do
not subsidize training in ambulatory settings outside the
hospital. Medicare IME payments rose from $2.9 billion in
1990 to $5.1 billion in 1995 [Ref. 115].
The implications of this payment mechanism are clear.
This mechanism provides financial incentives to train many
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physicians in hospital, not outpatient, settings. This is
completely out of step with the managed care reforms that
slowed health care cost growth in the private sector.
One of HCFA' s first initiatives to address the problem
of training excess physicians was the New York GME
demonstration project. This plan called for teaching
hospitals in New York to eliminate 20 percent of their
residency slots over a five year period. HCFA would provide
$400 million in transition payments over six years as a
positive incentive [Ref . 116]
.
The recently passed BBA (Public Law 105-33) totally
changes the incentive structure of Medicare GME payments.
First, this law overhauled the IME payment system. Section
4621 gradually decreases the IME payment increase of 7.7
percent for each 10 percent increase in the intern and
resident to bed ratio to 5.5 percent by 2001. It also
places a hospital specific cap on both the intern and
resident to bed ratio and the total number of intern and
residency positions. Most importantly, IME payments now
apply to GME training performed outside the hospital setting
as long as the hospital paid the residents' salary.
Section 4623 also sets a hospital specific cap for
interns and residents which affect the DME payments.
Section 4626 provides that hospitals agreeing to voluntarily
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reduce their residency positions by 20-25 percent over five
years, while maintaining the level of primary care training,
will be entitled to a certain level of hold-harmless
payments over those five years. Together, these provisions
provide incentives to train fewer specialties in hospitals
whil emphasizing primary care doctors in outpatient
settings.
This Act is also increasing the incentive for teaching
hospitals to merge and form GME consortia. Many prominent
teaching hospitals are planning mergers. One example is
Stanford University Medical Center and University of
California at San Francisco Hospital, which are two of the
top ten teaching hospitals in America [Ref. 117], Mount
Sinai Medical Medical Center and New York University Medical
Center are also merging [Ref. 118]
.
H. THE GROWTH OF THE HMO
By any standard, HMOs have experienced tremendous
growth in the American health care industry; this will have
tremendous impacts on GME. In 1970, there were 30 health
plans; in 1997 there were over 1,500 health plans with 82
percent being for profit [Ref. 119]
.
HMOs practice medicine by having primary care
physicians serve as the principal health care source for the
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plans' enrollees. Enrollees seek all care through their
PCM; the PCM makes all referrals to specialists that the PCM
deems appropriate. The PCM emphasizes preventive care and
wellness to maintain health and contain costs.
The enrollee has an incentive to use the PCM for all
health care needs because they incur lower copayments when
using this service. Moreover, there are financial
disincentives for seeking care without the PCM'
s
authorization. Many plans will not cover this care, except
for bona fide emergencies.
HMOs have succeeded in America primarily because they
contain costs. In the mid 1980' s, General Motors discovered
than it was spending more money on health care than on steel
for its cars [Ref . 120] . HMOs have been able to control
health plan premium growth. Annual increases were as high
as 18.6 percent in the mid 1980' s; they were just 2.5
percent in 1996. For this reason, 77 percent of Americans
insured through employee sponsored insurance programs plans
have managed care plans [Ref. 121].
HMOs are now experiencing heavy competition in the
growing managed care industry. Consolidations through
mergers has not been as cost effective as the parties hoped.
Competition has forced HMOs to cover some prescription drugs
not previously provided, and to offer other incentives to
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join health plans [Ref. 122]. One of the nation's highest
rated HMOs, Kaiser Permanente, lost money for the first time
since it was established in 1933 [Ref. 123]. All of these
events increase health care costs, and falling HMO stock
prices indicate declining stock market confidence in the
HMOs' ability to control cost while maintaining a healthy
profit margin [Ref. 124] .
HMOs such as Kaiser Permanente are now calling for
federal regulation to ensure greater standardization across
all health plans [Ref. 125] . As a result, President
Clinton's Consumer Bill of Rights was proposed in November
of 1997. The plan seeks eight modest reforms targeted at
HMOs. Three provisions are of particular importance for
GME: the right for access to high quality health care
providers, which could mean more visits to specialists; the
right to emergency medical care in situations that a
layperson would deem an emergency, which would increase the
potential for unnecessary emergency room visits; and the
right for patients to participate fully in all decisions
related to their health care, which again could lead to
inappropriate specialty visits [Ref. 126] . All of these
provisions could drive up short term costs and the demand




IV. POLICY, FINANCIAL, AND OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF GME
A. INTRODUCTION
Military GME programs historically help to both recruit
physicians into the military and retain doctors after their
initial obligated service. The programs have also provided
a means to care for the most seriously ill patients in MTFs
which offer a full spectrum of health care services; a broad
patient base is necessary for training [Ref . 127] .
Furthermore, the programs have enabled senior medical
officers the opportunity to broaden their professional
horizons. The have the opportunity to educate and train
newly graduated doctors though GME [Ref. 128] . Senior
medical officer teaching and oversight helps maintain the
quality of physicians serving in the military [Ref. 129]
.
Clearly, GME programs have been successful in these regards.
GME programs, like all programs with civilian
counterparts, have not escaped scrutiny in the post Cold War
era. Changes in the civilian health care industry and DOD
have raised questions within DOD regarding the size, scope,
and importance of military GME programs. This chapter
describes the current GME policy direction, DOD financing
changes, and an operational model used by the Navy to
rightsize its future GME needs.
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B. POLICY DIRECTION
The current DOD policy direction for military GME is
simple: GME programs and medical training will be Tri-
Service, integrated, consolidated, and reflect wartime and
day to day operational support requirements [Ref. 130].
The oversight body for GME and undergraduate medical
education is the Flag Officer Executive Committee on
Graduate Medical Education. This executive panel is chaired
by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Clinical
Services) and is responsible to OASD(HA). Its principal
duties include overseeing the ASD(HA) Strategic Plan for
rightsizing GME programs in the MHSS and promoting and
monitoring appropriate integration of military GME programs
[Ref. 131].
The committee also oversees planning and execution of
the annual Joint Service Graduate Medical Education
Selection Board ( JSGMESB) [Ref. 132] . The JSGMESB meets
every December to select both medical school graduates to
fill internship and residency positions as well as doctors
to pursue fellowships. The selectees are notified in
December, to ensure no conflict with the NRMP.
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C. GME POLICIES AND SIGNIFICANT POLICY ISSUES
The OASD Strategic Plan for rightsizing GME programs
has the following major principles:
• adjust the size of programs within accreditation
constraints to recognize the decline in the required
number of interns, residents, and fellows
• base the size and scope of GME programs on readiness
needs and eliminate programs clearly not needed
• eliminate all duplicate residency programs in close
geographic proximity other than primary care unless
the patient population or the military service
clearly justifies the need [Ref . 133]
.
A much stronger policy for GME rightsizing is the
Medical Program Guidance for Fiscal Year 1998-2003. This
policy directed the services to retain 25 to 30 percent of
physicians with an experience level between 5 and 12 years
beyond their initial specialty certification. Furthermore,
the policy specified the following:
• the National Capital Area (Walter Reed Army Medical
Center, National Naval Medical Center, and the
Malcolm Grow Air Force Medical Center) and San
Antonio (Wilford Hall Air Force Medical Center and
Brook Army Medical Center) MTFs would integrate all
remaining duplicate GME programs except for primary
care specialties
• GME programs with no trainees for two consecutive
years would be eliminated by 2001
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• the ratio of GME trainees to total active duty
physicians would be 2 6 percent
• GME programs would be readiness focussed
• primary care would be supported by all GME
specialties [Ref. 134].
Significant accreditation issues exist for GME
programs. The ACGME accredits GME programs in the United
States and develops policy regarding physician manpower and
training environments. First, the ACGME can specify the
minimum and maximum numbers of GME trainees per class. For
example, internal medicine's minimum number of residents per
class is 4. Second, the ACGME can specify the resident to
faculty ratio for an approved GME program. For example, the
internal medicine specialty' s minimum required full time
faculty to resident ratio is 1 to 6 [Ref. 135]
.
Figure 4.1 shows the ACGME specified minimum residents
per class and the minimum full time faculty to resident
ratio for all Navy inservice GME programs [Ref. 136] . Where
no minimum number of residents or faculty to student ratio
is specified, NS is listed.
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Aerospace Medicine NS NS
Anesthesiology NS NS
Anesthesiology - Pain Management NS 1 to 2
Dermatology NS 1 to 3
Emergency Medicine 6 1 to 3
Family Practice 4 1 to 6
Internal Medicine (IM) 4 1 to 6
IM - Cardiology 1 1 to 1.5
IM - Endocrinology 1 1 to 1.5
IM - Gastroenterology 1 1 to 1.5
IM - Hematology/Oncology 1 1 to 1.5
IM - Infectious Diseases 1 1 to 1.5
IM - Pulmonary Medicine/Critical Care 1 1 to 1
Neurology 2 NS
Neurosurgery 1 NS
Obstetrics and Gynecology 2 NS
Opthalmology 2 1 to 3
Orthopaedics NS 1 to 4




Pediatrics - Adolescent Medicine NS NS
Psychiatry NS NS
Radiology 2 NS
Radiology - Imaging NS NS
Surgery NS NS
Transitional Internship NS NS
Urology NS 1 to 2
SOURCE : ACGME (www . acgme . org
)
Figure 4 . 1
The ACGME can also specify the patient base that
residents must see. For example, internal medicine
residents must receive training and clinical experience in
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geriatric and adolescent medicine. Similarly, family
practice residents require a broad patient base.
The ACGME can also specify the setting in which
training takes place. For example, internal medicine
residents must receive at least 25 percent of their training
in outpatient settings [Ref . 137]
.
The accreditation standards have also specified
certain performance levels for residents taking
certification exams. For example, orthopaedics programs
seek for their residents to attain at least a 75 percent
passage rate on the initial certification examination [Ref.
138] .
An extremely significant accreditation issue for
military GME involves internships. The transitional
internship requires that at least 80 percent of interns
completing the program must continue in a residency program;
if not, the internship program risks losing accreditation
[Ref. 139]
.
The key person in the GME training program is the
program director. Every GME program has a single director,
including integrated military programs [Ref. 140] . The
program director is responsible for the quality of the GME
training programs. The program director appoints all
faculty and has the major input into residency selections.
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The accreditation standards also note the importance of
the program director. Programs can lose accreditation if
there are frequent changes in the program director. Some
specialties, like the transitional internship, require a
minimum term of service for the program directors. Some
programs, like obstetrics and gynecology, require the
program director to have at least five years of post
residency experience as a board certified obstetrician [Ref.
141]. All programs require the program director to be board
certified in the specialty program which he or she directs.
D. POLICY SUMMARY
The overall policy direction provided by OASD(HA) and
overseen by the Flag Officer GME Committee is specified in
the OASD(HA) Strategic Plan for rightsizing GME. It is
further clarified by the Medical Program Guidance for Fiscal
Year 1998-2003.
The accreditation issues with which GME programs must
deal have significant impacts for military GME. The
standards specify not just minimum number of residents and
faculty members, but also the care settings and the patient
base with which residents must receive clinical experience.
The broader the age groups and severity of illnesses
required, the broader the required patient base. The
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required patient base can range from infants to Medicare
eligible retirees.
The transitional year internship requirement mandating
that 80 percent of interns completing the program receive
further residency training is extremely significant. Since
GMOs, FSs, and UMOs typically receive only one year of
training prior to operational assignments, PGY-2 residency
programs in the military must offer residency positions to
at least 80 percent of the GMOs, FSs, and UMOs.
E. FINANCING MILITARY GME
The MHSS is now financing its medical services via
enrollment-based capitation. This financing mechanism began
in Fiscal Year 1998 and bases MTFs' budgets on the number of
TRICARE Prime beneficiaries enrolled in the MTF [Ref . 142]
.
This is completely different from any previous DOD financing
mechanism. Its major weakness is that not all TRICARE
Regions are operational, including the National Capital
Area. Therefore, some MTFs have no enrollees.
OASD(HA) recognizes that military GME has a different
mission than a normal hospital or clinic. Health care is
more costly in a teaching hospital because its mission
emphasizes quality physician education and training rather
than cost effective medical care. Given the difficulty of
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developing different capitation rates for different teaching
hospitals, OASD(HA) is continuing to fund GME programs for
the direct GME costs [Ref . 143]
.
However, enrollment-based capitation can indirectly
influence GME. Depending on the size and diversity of the
enrollee population, GME may not have enough patients to
maintain educational opportunities. This jeopardizes
accreditation. If the enrollee population is not broad
enough, major programs like family practice and internal
medicine may face accreditation issues.
Another possible financial implication deals with
Medicare Subvention. Subvention requires HCFA to reimburse
DOD and other federal health agencies for care provided to
Medicare eligible beneficiaries. This could mean that
military GME training programs could continue to see or
expand its Medicare eligible patient base. However, given
the sensitivity of the Medicare Trust Fund, and the fact
that DOD does not really know the historical level of care
it provided to Medicare eligible beneficiaries [Ref. 144],
it is unlikely that military GME programs can currently
benefit from Medicare Subvention.
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F. NAVY GME SIZING MODEL
In 1994, the Navy developed the Total Health Care
Support Readiness Requirements (THCSRR) model. This model
responded to budgetary and legilative pressures to rightsize
the Navy Medical Department [Ref . 145] . The THCSRR was
developed as a single readiness requirement which would
incorporate and build upon portions of the 733 Study. It
includes two components, readiness essential specialties and
specialties needed to sustain readiness essential
specialties
.
The Medical Operational Support Requirement (MOSR) is
the first component of the THCSRR. It is the basis for the
wartime and day to day operational readiness support
requirements. The second component of the THCSRR, which was
not included in the 733 report, identifies billets needed to
maintain future readiness requirements [Ref 14 6] . When the
sustainment component is combined with the MOSR, the result
is the THCSRR.
The GME portion of the THCSRR is the Graduate Medical
Education Infrastructure Sizing Model (GRISM) . The GRISM is
based upon the MOSR' s manpower requirements. It directly
links the appropriate number of GME training opportunities
to the GMO, FS, and UMO operational billets. The ratio of
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GME trainees to total Navy physicians must not exceed 25
percent.
The GRISM is a dynamic model that provides three GME
training scenarios: training in three medical centers,
training in two medical centers, and training in 2.5 medical
centers. It recommends the 2.5 medical centers option for
GME training and provides specialty breakdowns for the
associated readiness requirements. The model, however, does
not specify which medical centers will train which
specialties [Ref. 147].
The policy setting body for the BUMED is the Medical
Education Policy Council (MEPC) . The MEPC is chaired by the
Chief of the Navy Medical Corps. It evaluates, develops,
and proposes medical corps professional education policy for
review and approval by the Surgeon General of the Navy. The
MEPC also reviews, evaluates, and advises on all joint
service initiatives and on all proposals to establish,
disestablish, or modify GME programs [Ref. 148]
.
In February 1997, the MEPC recommended that the Surgeon
General restructure and reduce Navy GME programs [Ref. 149].
VADM Harold M. Koenig, the Navy Surgeon General, decided to
implement some of the recommendations, but made other
decisions based upon joint GME training considerations [Ref.
150] .
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Appendix C compares the current inservice internship
positions by MTF with the MEPC recommendations and the
Surgeon General's decision.
Appendix D compares the current inservice residency
positions by MTF with the MEPC recommendations and the
Surgeon General's decision.
Appendix E compares the current inservice fellowship
positions by MTF with the MEPC recommendations and the
Surgeon General's decision.
Appendix F compares the current total inservice GME
programs by MTF and specialty with the MEPC recommendations
and the Surgeon General's decisions.
Appendix G compares the current number of GME trainees
by specialty with the GRISM's output, the MEPC
recommendations, and the Surgeon General's decisions. It
quantifies the impact of the Surgeon General's decisions.
G. ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY RESTRUCTURING PLANS
The GRISM is a Navy specific plan which addresses the
size and scope of military GME positions based upon both the
readiness requirements for GMOs, FSs, and UMOs and the
accreditation requirements to maintain the minimum level of
inservice GME programs. This model stays well within the 25
percent limit imposed by the THCSRR, and within the 26
82
percent limit imposed by OASD(HA). The GRISM, however,
doesn't specify which medical centers will train which
specialities.
The MEPC made recommendations regarding the size and
scope of military GME. Specifically, the MEPC recommended
which hospitals would received the bulk of the cuts. The
MEPC reasoned that GME training should be focused on the two
major fleet medical centers: San Diego, California and
Portsmouth, Virginia. The integrated programs at Bethesda,
Maryland would absorb the majority of GME trainee cuts. The
MEPC used readiness criteria to select the specialties it
recommended retaining. It recommended retaining all primary
care programs while eliminating most fellowships [Ref. 151].
The Surgeon General's decisions also considered joint
service agreements with the Air Force and Army regarding
concentrating GME training in the National Capital Area,
San Antonio, Texas, San Diego, California, and Tacoma,
Washington. These joint service training considerations
dictated that Portsmouth, Virginia takes the bulk of the
cuts. Many of the fellowship programs eliminated under the
MEPC recommendations were maintained by the Surgeon
General's decisions. The Surgeon General also recommended
closing the family practice program at Bremerton,
Washington; Madigan Army Medical Center in Tacoma,
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Washington would be the center for that GME program [Ref.
152] . Both the MEPC and the Surgeon General plans
maintained slightly fewer internships than recommended by
the GRISM for GMOs, FSs, and UMOs
.
As an epilogue to the these developments. Congress
intervened. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1998
put the Surgeon General's plan on hold, pending a
Comptroller General study. This study is due to Congress on
1 March 1998 [Ref. 153]
.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
Military GME programs provide quality physicians and
surgeons for the military. More importantly, the military
GME programs have helped retain quality doctors, including
career medical officers, by both increasing opportunities to
specialize and providing opportunities to teach GME
trainees. Military GME programs have been subject to feast
and famine trends and have expanded and contracted given the
circumstances of the time. However, no single positive
incentive has historically retained career medical officers
like the GME programs.
Changes in the civilian health care sector have
affected GME training. Many studies and professional bodies
concluded that America has excess specialists and
insufficient generalist physicians, particularly primary
care physicians.
The single greatest factor causing changes in the
civilian health care sector was the dramatic increases in
health care costs. Cost increases spurred the growth of the
HMOs, which contained costs through PCMs and preventive
medicine. They deemphasized specialty care. This helped to
drive up the demand for primary care specialties, including
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pediatrics, family practice, and internal medicine; it drove
down the demand for non-primary care specialties. The chief
accomplishment of the HMO was to control dramatic cost
increases.
Despite their cost efficiencies, HMOs have also been
criticized for quality of care concerns, lack of services,
and complexity of plan benefits and rules. Such problems
have caused many HMOs and other interest groups to call for
reform and regulation. President Clinton's Consumer Bill of
Rights would be a modest step toward standardizing the
services provided by HMOs; it would also increase health
care costs. However, these effects cannot be quantified for
some time.
Another significant factor affecting civilian market
GME is the changes in GME subsidies introduced by the BBA.
Prior to this law, GME subsidies provided financial
incentives for teaching hospitals to train specialists vice
primary care physicians, to train in hospital vice
outpatient settings, and to train as many physicians as
possible. The BBA eliminated incentives to train only in
hospital settings and placed hospital specific caps on the
number of residents trained. Again, the effects of these
policy change cannot be quantified for some time. However,
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they should reduce specialty training while maintaining
primary care training.
Figure 5.1 summarizes the significant changes in
civilian medicine affecting GME.
CIVILIAN HEALTH CARE SECTOR CHANGES CULMINATING IN THE 1990s
Factors From To
Environment Specialty Demand Cost Containment
Insurance Fee for Service Managed Care
Care Delivery Specialty Care Primary Care
Care Setting Inpatient Outpatient
GME Subsidies Specialty Training Primary Care Training
Trainee Numbers Maximum Possible Residency Caps
Trainee Setting Inpatient Inpatient /Outpatient
GME Hospitals Stand Alone Mergers, Consortia
Figure 5 . 1
Changes in the military following the Cold War also
significantly impacted military medicine and GME. The
important question was not whether GME was training and
retaining quality physicians, but whether the size and scope
of military GME were appropriate for the MHSS following the
Cold War.
Figure 5.2 summarizes changes in the military which
have affected military GME following the end of the Cold
War.
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MAJOR POST COLD WAR MILITARY CHANGES IMPACTING GME
Factors From To
Threat Global Soviet Two MRCs
Infrastructure Buildup Base Closure
Defense Budgets $300 Billion Plus $250 Billion
Naval Fleet 600 Ship Navy 34 6 Ship Navy
Figure 5.2
The major military factor affecting military GME was
increasing the emphasis on readiness. Studies found that
medical manpower needed for wartime and day to day
operational readiness requirements in the post Cold War
military were substantially smaller than the existing
manpower. Studies also found that readiness essential
specialties were not always sufficient to maintain
readiness. For example, thoracic surgery and preventive
medicine are readiness essential specialties for which the
Navy has no inservice GME programs. Similarly, the
readiness essential specialty of anesthesiology was targeted
for cuts by both the MEPC and the Navy Surgeon General.
The TRICARE program further complicated GME training
issues. This program was designed to contain rising health
care costs by enrolling active duty and CHAMPUS eligible
beneficiaries in TRICARE Prime. It also prioritized MTF
care to favor Prime enrollees.
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TRICARE affects GME training in three ways. First,
TRICARE Prime requires training more primary care providers,
as in the civilian sector. Second, the more enrollees in
the teaching hospital, the larger the patient population
available for GME training programs. Third, the TRICARE
program is not open to Medicare eligible beneficiaries.
This restricts some programs from maintaining a broad
patient base.
The TRICARE program offers beneficiary choice, but
economics is the main force driving this program. The
TRICARE program was designed to initiate the health care
cost containment experienced in civilian HMOs. It is the
military' s attempt to conduct health care operations in a
more competitive, businesslike environment. However,
TRICARE is not operational in all regions, and its ability
to contain costs has been seriously questioned. Its
effectiveness cannot be known for some time after full
operation [Ref. 154]. Fully implementating TRICARE means
more GME training in primary care specialties and less GME
training in nonprimary care specialties.
The push to rightsize the MHSS medical personnel also
comes from economic pressures. Training personnel in excess
of requirements is not only expensive and wasteful, but
clearly cannot be justified in the military. Although
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military GME makes up a little more than one percent of the
budget, it drives additional personnel and service
requirements to support teaching hospitals. To a large
extent, GME can be performed in the private sector. Thus,
it has been considered for cuts like all programs with
civilian equivalents. To defend military GME, the military
medical departments contend that military GME better
prepares doctors for service in the fleet.
The military has attempted to unify its medical
departments by giving ASD(HA) control over the medical O&M
budget. This gave the ASD(HA) significant influence over
GME policy direction, particularly with respect to
rightsizing and joint GME operations. However, the ASD(HA)
doesn't control the medical MILPERS funds. Therefore,
ASD(HA) doesn't directly control the personnel aspect of
rightsizing efforts. All personnel cuts are ultimately
decided by the individual service. This has limited the
MHSS's ability to operate in a more businesslike manner in a
competitive health care environment, such as to institute
joint staffing of integrated GME programs.
Legislative actions have both provided the MHSS
flexibility in operating more like its civilian counterparts
and imposed limitations which civilian health care providers
don't face. Section 711 of the National Defense
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Authorization Act of 1991 restricted DOD' s ability to
downsize personnel and GME programs by placing a floor under
the number of military doctors to be retained on active
duty. However, legislative action which created the TRICARE
program to introduce managed care and contain costs has
allowed military medicine to offer benefits and options
comparable to the civilian sector.
Legislative actions have addressed controversial topics
requiring drastic changes in health care delivery. For
example. Section 745 of the National Defense Authorization
Act of 1996 required updating the 733 Study. This addressed
sustainment issues and other options not covered by the
original study. However, legislation like Section 748 of
the National Defense Authorization Act of 1998 appears to
suspend an approved GME restructuring plan. The suspended
restructuring plan considered every significant GME issue;
it simultaneously provided information and strategies for
making tough decisions on the future size and scope of Navy
GME.
Accreditation standards play an important role in GME
policy. Military programs must be accredited by the ACGME,
the same body that accredits civilian programs. This means
that military GME programs must be comparable in quality and
meet the same guidelines as civilian programs. Such
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requirements specify minimum numbers of residents, establish
resident to faculty ratios, and require a broad patient base
in some specialties from the young to the very old.
One significant difference between the military and
civilian GME programs involves funding. Enrollment-based
capitation is DOD' s method for allocating budgets to MTFs.
However, the GME portion of this equation is exempt from
capitation financing because care in a teaching hospital is
generally more expensive than in a non-teaching hospital.
GME funding is paid directly to the teaching hospital's
parent service. However, GME funding may be indirectly
affected by a teaching hospital's ability to enrollee
TRICARE Prime beneficiaries. Without sufficient enrollees,
GME programs must depend on referrals from the civilian
Prime PCMs and other military hospitals. The inability to
maintain an appropriate number and diversity of patients
will jeopardize a program's accreditation status.
Figure 5.3 summarizes the post Cold War changes in the
military affecting military GME.
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POST COLD WAR CHANGES IN THE MHSS AFFECTING GME
Factors From To
O&M Budgets Service Level Control DOD Level Control
MTF Budgeting Production Based Enrollment Based
Top Priority GME Training Readiness
Care Coordination Service Specific Regional Lead Agent
MTF Utilization Optimize Privitize
MTF Access Priority A/D Family Members Prime Enrollees
Dependent Care MTF/CHAMPUS MTF/TRICARE Options
Care Setting Inpatient Outpatient
GME Hospitals Service Specific Integrated
GME Training Offered Numerous Specialties Primary Care, Readiness




The MHSS has a primary readiness and a secondary
benefit mission. Both missions are supported by GME
training. GME training has provided a quality corps of
military physicians and surgeons. It has enhanced DOD'
s
ability to retain these officers in military service,
despite the disparity between military pay and benefits and
those offered by the civilian sector. From this point of
view, nothing is wrong with GME. It does provide an
effective means of training and retaining quality
physicians. However, it does not currently have the proper
size and scope for the post Cold War military.
Restructuring plans, such as the GRISM, the MEPC
recommendations, and the Navy Surgeon General's
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restructuring decisions represent, attempts to align the
Navy GME training billets with the post Cold War realities
of jointness, smaller programs, integrated programs in close
geographic proximity, and programs emphasizing readiness and
primary care specialties while simultaneously maintaining
readiness requirements. As structured, these plans seem to
realisticly picture the future size and scope of military
GME.
There is some interest, within DOD and Congress, in
further reducing GME programs . GME would focus only on
readiness specialties, while further privitizing the benefit
mission. While this seems economically feasible, many of
the readiness specialties are primary care specialties also.
Many specialties require a broad spectrum of patients, not
just a largely healthy active duty population, and a broad
range of services. For physicians to remain in current
practice, they must also have a sufficient volume of
patients. GME training programs also must have diverse
patients for training purposes.
Practicing only on active duty patients, who tend to be
extremely healthy, may be good business for HMOs, but it is
insufficient to maintain physician practice much less GME
training programs. Since the military must train physicians
with a broad patient base and in sufficient numbers to meet
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GME accreditation standards, particularly in readiness
required primary care specialties, it is not unreasonable
for the military to provide a portion of the beneficiary
mission.
Some parties assert that civilian GME programs can
provide the same, if not better, training opportunities for
military physicians. While that may be true, civilian GME
trained doctors have the lowest retention rates in military
medicine. In addition, military medicine suffered when it
pulled doctors out of civilian hospitals and into the Korean
War. This disrupted civilian GME programs. Ultimately, the
focus of military medicine is to preserve the fighting
strength in wartime and safeguard health in peacetime. If
retaining quality physicians and maintaining skills are
important for wartime deployments and situations, some form
of military GME is essential.
Accomplishing GME training and maintaining the skills
required for the readiness mission in civilian hospitals,
while simultaneously retaining quality physicians in the
military without full time inservice GME programs, will
require DOD to creatively craft physician incentive plans.
This is something DOD could not accomplish prior to the full
time inservice GME programs. It is also something for which
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which DOD does not have the congressional authority and
required flexibility.
Therefore, GME programs should be maintained in the
immediate future. This also requires maintaining some
elements of the benefit mission. However, these smaller,
joint, primary care, and readiness focussed programs must
also respond to changes in the military and the civilian
health care environment.
C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The author noted three areas germane to GME and
military medicine which provide research opportunities. The
first deals with managed care techniques and principals
taught in the civilian medical schools and GME programs.
This might compare the managed care principles taught in
civilian medical schools and GME programs to their
counterparts in USUHS and the military GME programs. It may
also examine military and civilian GME trainees' and
physicians' viewpoints regarding managed care education.
Another area of potential research deals with physician
retention which is commonly associated with GME. GME has
proven to retain quality physicians in the military long
after they complete their obligated service. However,
alternative approaches to increase this retention should be
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examined, given the dynamic health care environment. For
example, DOD is considering using current AFHPSP funding to
pay off medical student loans for board certified
specialists who were educated in civilian medical schools
and GME programs. In exchange, these doctors would join the
military [Ref. 155]. This directly bypasses the military
GME system. It breaks with the past because the military
wouldn't train these physicians.
Another potential area for research is the impact of
removing the Feres Doctrine protection for military
surgeons. Because military physicians cannot be sued under
the Feres Doctrine, they don't maintain malpractice
insurance. This is a major benefit, as this insurance is
extremely costly. A study might examine physicians'
viewpoints and the beneficiaries' perception of how quality






ABMS - American Board of Medical Specialties
ACGME - Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education
ACS - American College of Surgeons
AFHPSP - Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship
Program
AFMPC - Armed Forces Medical Policy Council
AMA - American Medical Association
ASD(HA) - Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
ASTP - Army Specialized Training Program
BBA - Balanced Budget Act of 1997
BRP - Blue Ribbon Panel on Navy Medicine
BUMED - U. S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
BUR - Bottom-Up Review
C-4 - Combat Casualty Care Course
CHAMPUS - Civilian Health and Medical Program for the
Uniformed Services
COGME - Council on Graduate Medical Education
CORM - Commission on Roles and Missions
DME - Direct Medical Education Costs of Medicare
DOD - Department of Defense
DRI - Defense Reform Initiative
FS - Flight Surgeon
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GME - Graduate Medical Education
GMO - General Medical Officer
GRISM - Graduate Medical Education Infrastructure Sizing
Model
HCFA - Health Care Financing Administration
HHS - Department of Health and Human Services
HMO - Health Maintenance Organization
IME - Indirect Medical Education Costs of Medicare
JSGMESB - Joint Service Graduate Medical Education
Selection Board
MEPC - U. S. Navy Medical Education Policy Council
MHSS - Military Health Services System
MILPERS - Military Personnel Appropriation
MOSR - Medical Operational Support Requirement
MRC - Major Regional Conflict
MTF - Medical Treatment Facility
NCMMEC - National Capital Military Medical Education
Consortium
NH - Naval Hospital
NMC - Naval Medical Center
NNMC - National Naval Medical Center
NRMP - National Residency Matching Program
OASD(HA) - Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health Affairs)
O&M - Operations and Maintenance Appropriation
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PCM - Primary Care Manager
PGY-1 - Postgraduate Year One (Internship Year)
PGY-2 - Postgraduate Year Two (Residency Years)
,
i.e. PGY-3, PGY-4, etc.
PPO - Preferred Provider Organization
QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review
RRC - Residency Review Committee
SECDEF - Secretary of Defense
THCSRR - Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirements
TYRC - Transitional Year Review Committee
UMO - Underseas Medical Officer
USUHS - Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences




TYPICAL PATTERNS OF RESIDENCY TRAINING, BY SPECIALTY*




General Pediatrics Subspecialties of Pediatrics |
General Internal Medicine (IM)














Transitional YR Physical Medicine
Transitional YR Radiology
*Spurce National Residency Matching Program Directory (Evanston, 111; NRMP, 1993)
AMA Directory of Graduate Medical Education Programs




NAVY INTERNSHIPS (PRESENT AND PROPOSED)





























Family Practice 6 12 13 10 41
Internal Medicine 21 19 20 60
OB/GYN 4 5 6 15
Pediatrics 5 8 8 21
Psychiatry 3 4 4 11
Surgery 13 15 22 50
Transitional 12 15 22 49
Total 58 66 82 6 12 13 10 247





























Family Practice 6 12 13 10 41
Internal Medicine 21 19 20 60
OB/GYN 5 6 11
Pediatrics 8 8 16
Psychiatry 4 4 8
Surgery 13 15 22 50
Transitional 12 15 22 49
Total 46 66 82 6 12 13 10 235





























Family Practice 12 13 10 35
Internal Medicine 21 19 20 60
OB/GYN 4 6 10
Pediatrics 5 8 13
Psychiatry 3 4 7
Surgery 13 15 22 50
Transitional 12 15 22 49




NAVY RESIDINCIES (PRESENT AND PROPOSED)
































Aerospace Medicine 15 15 3
Anesthesiology 18 12 18 48 3
Dermatology 21 9 30 3
Emergency Medicine 24 24 48 3
Family Practice 12 24 26 20 82 2
Internal Medicine 14 20 24 58 2
Neurology 15 15 3
Neurosurgery 6 6 6
OB/GYN 12 18 15- 45 3
Ophthalmology 9 8 17 3
Orthopaedics 12 12 20 44 4
Otolaryngology 10 10 8 28 5
Pathology 8 8 8 24 4
Pediatrics 20 12 12 44 2
Psychiatry 9 12 12 33 3
Radiology 8 24 3; 4
Surgery 12 8 16 36 4
Surgery - Research 1 1 1 3 1
Urology 4 4 8 4
Urology 5 5 5
Total 179 141 Z04 12 24 26 20 15 621
































Aerospace Medicine 24 24 3
Anesthesiology 12 18 30 3
Dermatology 9 9 3
Emergency Medicine 24 24 48 3
Family Practice 12 24 26 20 82 2
Internal Medicine 14 20 24 58 2
Neurology 3
Neurosurgery 6
OB/GYN 18 15 33 3
Ophthalmology 9 8 17 3
Orthopaedics 12 12 20 44 4
Otolaryngology 10 8 18 5
Pathology 8 8 16 4
Pediatrics 12 12 24 2
Psychiatry 12 12 24 3
Radiology 24 24 4
Surgery 12 8 16 36 4
Surgery - Research 1 1 1 3 1
Urology 4 4 4
Urology 5 5 5
Total 52 137 204 12 24 26 20 24 4 99
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Aerospace Medicine 33 33 3
Anesthesiology 12 18 30 3
Dermatology 6 9 15 3
Emergency Medicine 24 24 48 3
Family Practice 24 26 20 70 2
Internal Medicine 14 18 2Z 54 2
Neurology 6 6 3
Neurosurgery 6 6 6
OB/GYN 12 15 27 3
Ophthalmology 9 9 3
Orthopaedics 12 12 20 44 4
Otolaryngology 10 10 20 5
Pathology 8 8 16 4
Pediatrics a 12 20 2
Psychiatry 9 12 21 3
Radiology 8 24 32 4
-Surgery 12 8 16 36 4
Surgery - Research 1
Urology 5 5 4
Urology 10 10 5
Total 128 62 209 24 26 20 33 502
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APPENDIX E
NAVY FELLOWSHIPS (PRESENT AND PROPOSED)
















Anethesia - Pain Management 1 1 1
Internal Medicine - Cardiology 3 6 6 12
Internal Medicine - Endocrinology 2 2 2
Internal Medicine - Gastroenterology 3 3 3 6
Internal Medicine - Hematology/Oncology 3 3 3
Internal Medicine - Infectious Diseases 2 4 4 8
Internal Medicine - Pulmonary Medicine/Critical Care 3 6 6 12
Orthopedics - Hand Surgery 1 1 1
Pediatrics - Adolescent Medicine 1 1 1
Radiology - Imaging 1 1 1
Total 24 1 22 47
















Anethesia - Pain Management 1 1 1
Internal Medicine - Cardiology 3 6 6
Internal Medicine - Endocrinology 2
Internal Medicine - Gastroenterology 3
Internal Medicine - Hematology/Oncology 3
Internal Medicine - Infectious Diseases 2 4 4
Internal Medicine - Pulmonary Medicine/Critical Care 3 6 6
Orthopedics - Hand Surgery 1 1 1
Pediatrics - Adolescent Medicine 1
Radiology - Imaging 1
Total 1 17 18
















Anethesia - Pain Management 1
Internal Medicine - Cardiology 3 6 6 12
Internal Medicine - Endocrinology 2 2 2
Internal Medicine - Gastroenterology 3 3 3
Internal Medicine - Hematology/Oncology 3 3 3
Internal Medicine - Infectious Diseases 2 4 4 8
Internal Medicine - Pulmonary Medicine/Critical Care a 6 6 12
Orthopedics - Hand Surgery i 1 1
Pediatrics - Adolescent Medicine i
Radiology - Imaging i




TOTAL GME POSITIONS (PRESENT AND PROPOSED)





























Internships 58 66 82 6 12 13 10 247
Residencies 179 141 204 12 24 26 20 15 621
Fellowships 24 1 22 47
Total 261 208 308 18 36 39 30 15 915





























Internships 46 66 82 6 12 13 10 235
Residencies 52 137 204 12 24 26 20 24 499
Fellowships 1 17 18
Total 98 204 303 18 36 39 30 24 752





























Internships 58 49 82 12 13 10 224
Residencies 128 62 209 24 26 20 33 502
Fellowships 24 17 41




COMPARISON OF NAVY GME RESTRUCTURING PLANS
*GRISM "GRISM
Program Present Interns Residencies MEPC SG 'lr *Chanqe
Family Practice 41 43 41 35 -6
Internal Medicine 60 40 60 60
OB/GYN 15 15 11 10 -5
Pediatrics 21 21 16 13 -8
Psychiatry 11 12 8 7 -4
Surgery 50 12 50 50
Transitional 49 3 7 49 49
Total Interns 247 146 7 235 224 -23
Aerospace Medicine 15 4 10 24 33 18
Anesthesiology 48 20 48 30 30 -18
Dermatology 30 4 10 9 15 -15
Emerqency Medicine 48 16 38 48 48
Family Practice 82 69 82 70 -12
Internal Medicine 58 64 58 54 -4
Neurology 15 3 7 6 -9
Neurosurgery 6 1 6 6
OB/GYN 45 36 33 27 -18
Occupational Health 2 3
Opthalmology 17 3 7 17 9 -8
Orthopaedics 44 12 38 44 44
Otolaryngology 28 5 20 18 20 -8
Pathology 24 4 13 16 16 -8
Pediatrics 44 34 24 20 -24
Preventive Medicine 3 5
Psychiatry 33 29 24 21 -12
Radioloqy 32 10 32 24 32
Surgery 39 38 39 36 -3
Uroloqy 13 4 13 9 15 2
Total Residents 621 91 520 499 502 -119
Anesthesia-Pain Manaqqement 1 1 -1
Internal Medicine - Cardioloqy 12 6 12
Internal Medicine - Endocrinoloqy 2 2
Internal Medicine - Gastroenteroloqy 6 3 -3
Internal Medicine - Hematoloqy/Oncoloqy 3 3
Internal Medicine - Infectious Diseases 8 4 8
Internal Medicine - Pulmonary Medicine/Critical Care 12 6 12
Orthopaedics - Hand Surqery 1 1 1
Pediatrics - Adolescent Medicine 1 -1
Radioloqy - Imaging 1 -1
Total Fellowships 47 18 41 -6
Total Proqrams - GRISM 237 527
Total Programs 915 764 752 767 -148
*Based on the 2.5 Medical Center Plan
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